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T

he United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Kuwait (1991) for clearance after the First Gulf War and in

has supported mine action in more than 40 countries

Central America (1992) for clearance of minefields resulting

since its first involvement in Cambodia in 1992. UNDP sup-

from internal conflicts. The former was conducted on a com-

port generally focuses on the development of national mine

mercial basis and financed by the Kuwait government, and the

action management capacities. In early 2016, the Independent

Organization of American States in cooperation with nation-

Evaluation Office (IEO) of UNDP concluded the first global

al armed forces supported the latter. UNDP was not involved

evaluation of the results of UNDP support in mine action,

with any of these mine action programs.

with particular attention to its effectiveness and impact.1 The

Initial UNDP involvement in mine action was a corollary

evaluation reviewed documentation relating to all national,

of U.N. peacekeeping missions during the first half of the

UNDP-supported mine action programs, in-depth desk re-

1990s (Cambodia, 1992; Mozambique, 1993; Angola, 1994).

views of support to 14 countries, and background for field case

In these cases, peacekeeping missions were contracted for de-

studies of three national programs (Laos, Mozambique, and

mining services (i.e., road access, resettlement areas, etc.) and

Tajikistan). It also included visits to two dozen communities

to train local personnel as deminers. These missions did not

in Laos (n=8), Mozambique (n=11), and Tajikistan (n=5)—all

have a mechanism to continue financing or employing trained

of which were previously mine-affected and where demining

teams beyond the life of the mission, and looked to UNDP

had occurred at least five years before the evaluation visit. The

to recruit deminers and channel funding. In each country,

evaluation highlighted several important lessons regarding ef-

UNDP established specific projects and organizations for

fectiveness of international support in mine action and pro-

this purpose—managed by UNOPS, which has continued

vided important nuances to the discussion of impact in mine

to implement those projects for UNDP since 1995. UNDP

action. UNDP management accepted the recommendations

gained further experience on a country-by-country basis in

addressed to it.

Laos (1995), as well as with the peacekeeping missions for

2

Origin and Development of UNDP
Mine Action Support

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in the mid-1990s. On
the groundwork of an important multicountry study in 1997,
the maturing international mine action community conclud-

Modern mine action began with the U.N. decision in late

ed that the national mine action center should not be an op-

1988 to train and equip Afghans living in refugee settlements

erator to minimize the labor and budgetary implications—as

in Pakistan to return to their country to clear landmines. In

well as potential conflicts of interest in allocation of funds—

1989, a U.N. coordination office was established to oversee

and to insulate the national (or international) authority from

the process, with national nongovernmental organizations

liabilities. 3 Other major NGOs that would have a global role

(NGO) as the main operators; The HALO Trust was estab-

in mine action joined The HALO Trust in the early 1990s:

lished as the first mine action international NGO (INGO). In

MAG (Mines Advisory Group), Handicap International (HI),

2002, the Afghanistan program was transferred to the United

and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).

Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) for implementation

International civil society’s reaction to the lasting effects

by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

of landmine contamination in the aforementioned coun-

Globally, the next mine action programs were established in

tries led to the 1997 adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
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Community maps in Mozambique showing contamination drawn by women.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Rebecca Roberts.

Convention (APMBC), transforming international mine ac-

as well as separating both from field operations, are all from

tion. First, it established an obligation for each mine-affected

this period. During the first years of the APMBC until the

State Party to remove all known minefields from its territory,

First Review Conference in 2004, most countries with histor-

as well as a provision that each State Party in a position to do

ic mine problems established national UNDP-supported pro-

so would provide assistance for such efforts. Although the im-

grams with the exception of those coming out of immediate

plication was not immediately clear to all, this implied a long-

conflicts, which more often had UNMAS-managed programs.

term effort to clear every mine rather than simply make each

Initially it was expected that UNMAS would have opera-

country safe. Second, the United Nations, NGOs, and com-

tional responsibility for peacekeeping mine action programs,

mercial demining firms understood that international mine

which UNOPS would implement to provide continuity, then

action would continue for many years, and that they should

hand over to UNDP as each program’s mission ended. This

organize themselves accordingly. UNMAS and the dedicated

changed for several reasons:

mine action units of UNDP, UNOPS, and UNICEF were established during this period, as was the Geneva International
Centre

for

Humanitarian

Demining

(GICHD).

The

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the dedicated
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA),
and the institutional model of separating the national mine
action entity for operational management from that of policy,

46

FIELD NOTES @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

1.

There were delays in UNDP picking up some national
programs.

2. UNMAS staff believed they were more effective at re-

sponding to mine problems than UNDP or national

3.

bureaucracies.
UNMAS involvement typically was accompanied by much
greater donor resources than those UNDP could attract.

Community maps in Mozambique showing contamination drawn by men.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Rebecca Roberts.

An effective UNMAS program during this period was
in Kosovo (1999–2001), in which the U.N. Mine Action
Coordination Center coordinated the technical response and
resources to largely resolve the mine problem without the national government. The international staff of UNDP mine action support projects sometimes had to unlearn lessons from
Kosovo in order to become mine action advisers rather than
mine action managers to focus on developing national capacities to manage the respective mine action program.

National Ownership

of staff passports. The evaluation identified a few essential aspects of national ownership:

*
*
*
*

Formal establishment of the national mine action entity
Inclusion of the national mine action entity in the regular government budget
Inclusion of mine action in the national recovery and
development plan
Adherence to key relevant treaties (e.g., APMBC)

UNDP is particularly capable of developing a formal, institutional framework for mine action. Institutional support
and capacity building are aspects of most mine action support

Distinguishing the development of national ownership

programs and are commonly carried out by GICHD, UNDP,

from the development of technical management capacity is

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNMAS, bilater-

important. UNDP has generally been successful in support-

al donors, and also NGOs in some cases. However, in peace-

ing institutionalization of national ownership—which is more

keeping contexts, the presence of UNMAS is generally due to a

comprehensive than developing national technical capacity—

breakdown in government capacity, and it acts in substitution

and projects staffed and managed by nationals. National own-

of government with that role somewhat begrudgingly accept-

ership is a question of government commitment rather than

ed. Governments do not change institutional structures to fit
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1988–1997

1998–2004

2005–present

UN-Managed

UNDP

UN-Managed UNDP

UN-Managed

UNDP

Afganistan
Angola
Bosnia
Croatia
Mozambique
Northern Iraq

Angola
Bosnia
Cambodia
Lao PDR
Mozambique

Burundi
Cyprus
DR Congo
Iraq
Kosovo
Lebanon
Sudan
UNMEE
W. Sahara

CAR
Chad
Colombia
Cote d’Ivoire
Darfur
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Nepal
OPT
Somalia
South Sudan

Algeria
Burundi
(Cyprus)
(Egypt)
(Liberia)
(Libya)
(Malawi)
(Pakistan)
(Rep. of Congo)
(Sudan)
(Uganda)
Vietnam
(Zambia)
(Zimbabwe)

Afghanistan
Albania
(Armenia)
Azerbaijan
Bosnia
Chad
Colombia
Croatia
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
(Iran)
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Mauritania
Senegal
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Tajikistan
Thailand
(Ukraine)
Yemen

Note: (Country) = Limited UNDP Support

Table 1. Initiation of UN-managed and UNDP-supported mine action programs.
Figure courtesy of the authors.

the needs of a peacekeeping mission, which is generally considered to be an infringement of national sovereignty.

ment is seen by many as not carrying over to the technical

UNDP has not been universally successful in develop-

side of demining. Close working partners supplied much of

ing government ownership. In some cases—including Laos,

the specific technical support provided under the UNDP um-

Mozambique, and Tajikistan—the national mine action entity

brella. In the early years of UNDP mine action, UNOPS sup-

continued for more than a decade as a UNDP project with-

ported the implementation services and developed rosters of

out proper institutionalization or inclusion in the national

experts and suppliers. One or more NGOs or specialized firms

budget. Although conducted in agreement between the gov-

then provided operational support for demining. GICHD

ernment, UNDP, and some donors, such situations delayed es-

supports operational policy development in many countries,

sential actions for long-term sustainability and created donor

and its advisers continue providing mine action expertise to

doubt regarding national commitment.

governments supported by UNDP. The ad hoc relationship

Support and Development of National
Mine Action Management Capacity

Based on lessons learned in the late 1990s, the evaluation

team identified the key management capacities that the national mine action center requires as information manage-
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UNDP’s comparative advantage in institutional develop-

with GICHD has been particularly valuable, whereby GICHD
provides technical expertise and relies on UNDP for countrylevel access, support, and coordinated follow-up.

Information Management

Quality of data and reporting is vital to the credibility of

ment, strategic planning, quality management of operations,

the national mine action program. All mine action programs

and resource mobilization. Expertise in each area can be de-

and operators endeavor to maintain good records of the dem-

veloped through specific training and experience. However,

ining work conducted and areas of suspected contamination.

trained personnel may not remain in the national entity once

In the past, personnel used a simple spreadsheet or database,

the international project ends.

but complexity grew as the amount of data increased with
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surveys of suspected hazardous areas (SHA), as well as with

financial resources required to complete the task on time.

the introduction of GIS and mapping capabilities. Database

The first plans were often produced with considerable input

and mapping tools developed during the 1990s due to the

by international advisers, and in many cases, funded through

need to record the entirety of the landmine problem and the

UNDP. Over time, with more experience and better infor-

detail of site-specific operational work—with GICHD estab-

mation, later strategic plans were more realistic and included

lishing the IMSMA for UNMAS. In many cases, IMSMA

wider national and local participation. The process of prepar-

was installed in parallel with conducting a Landmine Impact

ing APMBC Article 5 extension requests has been an impor-

Survey (LIS), although some existing programs were reluctant

tant impetus to strengthen the quality and realism of national

to replace their own database systems with IMSMA. GICHD

mine action plans.

4

provided the IMSMA software and training free of charge to

Prioritization of land clearance tasks was a vital component

mine action programs. As efforts were made to improve tech-

of strategic planning. During the initial periods of peacekeep-

nical skills, IMSMA was used as the basis for strategic plan-

ing and humanitarian emergency programs, high-priority

ning in response to the overall mine and explosive remnants

tasks were easy to discern, and less emphasis was placed on

of war (ERW) problem.

assessing the relative importance of second-tier sites for clear-

Development of information-management systems with-

ance. Once emergency tasks were resolved, a large number of

in government structures has been an especially difficult

competing priorities with which to contend remained, bring-

capacity-development challenge in many countries due to

ing increased importance to prioritization. However, there

the difficulty of retaining qualified staff. The data quality

was little practical guidance:

and management of the system improved over time but was
frequently interrupted by the loss of qualified personnel to
better paying, private-sector career opportunities. These positions often received salary top-ups, and new technical per-

*

The APMBC set clearance deadlines but provided no

*

UNMAS published a suggested set of general priori-

prioritization.
ties in 1998 that included emergency assistance; set-

sonnel required fresh training on a continual basis. GICHD

tled land with high civilian casualties; land required

primarily provided technical support, with donor financing

for resettlement of IDPs and refugees; land required

through UNDP. A continued need for technical and finan-

for agriculture; community development; access to free

cial support for information management is likely, even with

operation of health services; and reconstruction and

a well-established national mine action management entity.

infrastructure. 5

This is a long-term global challenge to maintain the specialized capacity required for mine action centers.

*

Demining operators sought to maximize the efficiency
of their teams and equipment, and prioritized factors

Lastly, in many programs when information-management

such as physical and seasonal access as well as suitabil-

systems were upgraded or a new baseline survey was conduct-

ity of minefields for available demining assets (climate,

ed, previous data sets were set aside. For example, the 2015

vegetation, topography, and nature of the landmine/

mine action database in Mozambique goes back to 2008, miss-

ERW contamination). For operators, safety and ease of

ing the information for demining conducted during the first

use took precedence over the impact on beneficiary use

15 years of the national program. This greatly reduces its use-

of the land.

fulness for long-term development and land-use planning, for
which it would be valuable as a georeferenced data set similar to ones for hazardous waste and other environmental contamination, flood plains, and earthquake hazards.

Strategic Planning and Prioritiz ation

Landmine Impact Surveys and
Evidence-based Priority Setting

The introduction of LIS in the late 1990s was a deliberate

effort to shift the practice of setting priorities based on minefield characteristics and operator capabilities to focusing on

The global mine action community recognizes the value of

communities with socioeconomic problems caused by sus-

strategic planning as an essential element of effective nation-

pected mined areas. UNDP (together with UNMAS, UNOPS,

al mine action programs. Previously, programs with annual

and the Survey Working Group) was an early promoter of LIS

operational plans began to develop strategies that assessed

as a means to obtain more complete information, not only of

the known extent of the problem, considered the level of op-

suspected mined areas, but also of their socioeconomic im-

erational activities necessary to resolve it, and projected the

pacts on affected communities. LIS was carried out in heavily

ISSUE 20.3 @ NOVEMBER 2016

49

A woman cultivates vegetables for consumption
and market under Pylon 183.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Rebecca Roberts.
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mine-affected countries between 1999 and 2006. LIS and other impact-assessment tools were introduced to ensure that assets would have the greatest positive result for mine-affected
communities. LIS increased the socioeconomic benefit of demining by focusing greater demining resources on resolution
of community problems. This was done at the expense of reducing its operational efficiency by increasing the estimated
size of SHAs for demining and increasing the frequency with
which demining teams moved to address higher impact areas.
While UNDP focused particular attention to higher socioeconomic impact areas, national governments sought demining support for infrastructure, regardless of the level of existing local socioeconomic impact.
Experience has confirmed the merits of a two-tier approach
to priority-setting for demining, with national prioritization
at the broad category level of blocked resources (roads, markets, water ways, farmland), coupled with the selection of specific tasks based on local needs. UNDP-supported planning
processes have in some cases overemphasized local priorities,
with insufficient hazard evidence. To avoid this risk, the first
operational response should be precise surveying rather than
clearance. As evidence-based approaches to priority setting
were applied in different countries, they resulted in increased
numbers of mines removed per hectare cleared and a reduction in the percentage of tasks where no mines were found.
This approach was advocated for some years by GICHD,
UNDP, UNMAS, UNOPS, NGOs, and with the support of donors. Over time, most programs developed a combined methodology for priority setting—partly impact, partly technical,
and partly prioritization by local authorities.

UNDP Support of and Impact on Mine Action

During the evaluation-inception phase, the team identi-

fied possible impacts from demining on local communities:
improvements in household income resulting from the ability to use previously contaminated land; reduction in time required to travel to markets and service centers due to use of
more direct routes; and a reduced number of new mine victims. Given UNDP’s focus on marginalized populations, the
team also sought to determine whether the benefits of demining were being captured by elites, for example with displacement of poorer populations that previously had accepted risk
and farmed or lived in hazardous areas.
The evaluation team identified these possible impacts, recognizing the gap between UNDP upstream activities and
actual demining carried out by operators. UNDP support is
usually several steps removed from direct impact on communities and can be considered effective to the extent its actions
result in greater government focus, rule-setting, and management capacity. Respectively, these can positively affect
the laws and procedures set in place for demining, prioritization of areas for demining, and quality of demining results.
Indeed, UNDP mine action support activities have many positive results: development of national statutes and demining strategies; trained deminers; stronger quality assurance;
improved information management and greater understanding of the landmine problem; more effective use of resources;
less time spent on clearance of areas without mines; greater
total areas cleared, etc. These are important results, yet the
evaluation deliberately focused on downstream changes in
the living conditions of the beneficiary population, and the

National Mine Action Standards
and Quality Management

team endeavored to find links between UNDP mine action

part of the quality-management process, together with the

and Tajikistan, and based on evidence from interviews, focus

National mine action standards (NMAS) form a critical

operator-accreditation process, and the verification of cleared
land. In countries where it has helped establish mine action
programs, UNDP has supported the issuance of NMAS to
guide the management and implementation process. In most
countries the first NMAS were developed by an internation-

work and perceived benefits to local communities.
Across the 24 communities visited in Laos, Mozambique,
group discussions, and documentary evidence, the main (perceived) problems caused by mine/ERW contamination from
the perspective of community members and local officials
were

*

The proximity of land contaminated with mines and

al technical adviser, who essentially adapted the IMAS (since

ERW caused fear. People worried about themselves,

2001) or other existing mine action program standards (be-

their families (particularly children), livestock, and

fore 2001) to the country in question. The resulting first stan-

friends.

dards were nearly always in English. Over time NMAS were
revised and translated into national languages. Some revi-

*

Contamination interfered with freedom of movement,
as mined roads affected the delivery of assistance and

sions consider national experience, although changes to glob-

transport of goods, and contamination prevented chil-

al IMAS continue to drive most countries’ revisions.

dren from going to school on their own.
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Outcomes of the focus group discussion with beneficiaries on the impact of clearance, Asingtai (New) Village, Samouy District,
Saravan Province, Laos.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Paul Davis.

*
*

Contamination restricted access to natural resources,

unimpeded, farming larger plots of land or existing plots

impeding the collection of firewood, mushrooms, me-

more efficiently. Farmers, who previously worked contam-

dicinal herbs, grass to make hay for animals in the win-

inated fields cautiously, were able to dig deeper with their

ter, and water for drinking and irrigation.

equipment and move faster across their land, accessing wa-

Fear, restricted movement, and restricted access all led

ter and other resources more easily. The observed economic

to reduced economic opportunity and well-being—

improvements were primarily due to personal initiative rath-

especially for mine victims—with significant long-term

er than specific economic development or job-creation assis-

repercussions, such as increased vulnerability and pov-

tance from the government, the U.N. or NGOs to promote

erty for those affected.

development following clearance.

The principal impact on the community came from the

Most community members who were interviewed report-

broader sense of safety and ability to move freely throughout

ed that besides immediate medical attention, no support was

the area. When questioned about what had changed as a result

provided for mine survivors and their families. Community

of demining activity, local residents indicated they felt more

members stated that in the absence of victim support, the socio-

secure and could “walk without fear.” In virtually all of the

economic conditions of mine survivors were consistently

communities visited, the inhabitants (male and female) re-

worse than they had been prior to the mine/ERW accident.

ported significant safety improvements following clearance.
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The evaluation did not find evidence that the release of pre-

While community members believed that socioeconomic

viously contaminated land was a significant source of conflict.

conditions at the community level had improved, the extent

Although cleared land was generally put to use, it was not a

was highly variable and difficult to quantify. In most villag-

new resource available for use by new claimants. In the coun-

es visited, evidence indicated improved living standards as

tries visited, the families who traditionally used the land were

a result of the mine action effort. Community members ex-

known and continued to use the land before and after clear-

pressed that they could resume their normal daily activities

ance. Where this was not the case, there was an established
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procedure to allocate new land, which was applied to cleared
land. Short of a land-reform process, the evidence suggests
that clearance in these countries has not created a new asset
to be distributed at the will of the government (or of any international actor). Although respondents in all three of the
countries visited were aware of disputes over land, none of
them reported that these disputes were related to cleared land.

Conclusion

The transition to national ownership of mine action in

some countries aided by UNDP has been slow and inconsistent, and the sustainability of some nationally managed
programs remains in question. In two of the three case
countries, the national mine action entity remained UNDP
projects until recently, despite decades of UNDP capacitybuilding support.
UNDP has sought to mainstream gender in its mine action
programming, particularly through calling attention to the
U.N. Gender Guidelines for Mine Action and seeking support
of the Gender and Mine Action Program hosted by GICHD.
Basic integration of gender in mine action is widely accepted
(e.g., surveys of women as well as men for information on suspected areas; relevance of sex disaggregated data on mine victims). Nonetheless, little evidence shows that UNDP support
in this area has transformed national mine action programs,
and further efforts to improve gender equity are required.
The livelihood improvements evident after demining in
the observed communities stemmed mostly from local initiatives, enabled by reduced risk and improved access or by
specific programs sponsored by UNDP and national gov-
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ernment partners. As mine action programs mature, they
tend to become increasingly focused on poor rural communities confronted by a wide array of development challenges. Economic development and job-creation programs
would benefit from including the requirements of such
mine affected communities.
See endnotes page 67
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